Format War Deja Vu. Now in Hi-Def!

The ongoing war between the next-generation high definition formats HD DVD and Blu-Ray Disc seems to be finally coming to an end, with the latter emerging as a clear winner.

The defections from the HD DVD format, backed by companies like Microsoft, Fuijitsu and Kenwood, was prompted by the announcement in early January of Warner Brothers to release its titles exclusively on the Blu-Ray Disc, supported by companies Sony, Apple and Dell. The exodus from HD DVD has continued: Netflix, the online DVD rental service in the States announced a month later that it too will start phasing out HD DVD and switch to Blu-Ray only by the end of the year, and The Times has reported that as many as 20 companies currently part of the HD DVD Promotion Group are contemplating removing their names from that list [1].

Since both the formats were introduced in 2003, neither had shown a clear lead in the race. Having learnt from the infamous format wars in the late 1970s – 80s between Sony’s Betamax and JVC’s VHS home video formats, both the HD camps have maneuvered to gain a majority share in the home entertainment market, so as to benefit from network externalities and ‘bandwagon effects’. Network externalities refers to how an individual purchasing a good would indirectly benefit other consumers; in this case, the more consumers choose Blu-ray Disc players, the more likely rental services or DVD shops are likely to stock Blu-Ray discs, and the easier for other consumers to find and enjoy their high definition DVDs. This in turn would lead to the ‘bandwagon effect, where momentum for a particular product builds up, encouraging the support of consumers, distributors, licensees, such that it becomes the industry standard. Considering this, it seems rational for Sony to have release their Playstation 3 game console—which features a Blu-Ray Disc drive—at a significant loss.

It has been argued that unlike the Betamax-VHS format war, the present competition has effectively been decided in boardrooms, with the major studios making the decision of where their loyalties lie before consumers. In this respect, network externalities and bandwagon effect at the producers and distributors’ level was what mattered in the current war– the more studios back one format, the easier and cheaper it would be for producers to mass produce the discs. However, it must be noted that Blu-Ray discs were already outselling HD DVDs by about two to one in the first three quarters of 2007 [2], such that it may be too early right now to declare whether it was the consumers or producers who decided the winner of the format war.

Rationale Reckons:
- Since companies are already working on the successor to Blu-Ray Disc format, and DVDs are still holding up, is it possible that we may leap-frog this HD format, such that it doesn't quite matter who won this round?
- Would this development matter much to those of us who seem to be increasingly enjoying our media in out formats (...downloading, anyone?)
- Lord of the Rings on Blu-Ray...at last!

Sources
[1] Lewis, Leo “Blu-Ray takes inside edge in war with HD-DVD” (8th January, 2008) Times Online
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/media/article3153038.ece

[2] McBride, Sarah. “DVD formats Blu-Ray, HD square off” (30th September 2007) http://www.charleston.net/news/2007/sep/30/dvd_formats_blu_ray_hd_square_off17561/

Organ donation....need a catchy title suggestions welcome

By James Wisson (being edited by Jagoda)

In the year that the NHS turns 60, Gordon Brown started a new policy debate over the issue of organ donation with an article in the Sunday Telegraph. He described the shortage of organ donations in the UK as “an avoidable human tragedy we can and must address.”[1] His proposed solution? To change from an ‘opt-in’ system, in which potential donors have to register their wishes to donate their organs, to an ‘opt-out’ system of presumed consent. Recent research from the likes of David Laibson that overlaps economics with psychology can help explain why this might increase the number of donors.

But first of all, how big is this shortage of organs? From the 1st April 2006 to 31st March 2007, 3,087 patients had transplants to save or improve their lives of which about 5 in 6 came from a deceased donor. However, 459 patients died during this period and by the end of it, 7,234 people remained on the active transplant waiting list (with a further 1,915 on the temporarily suspended transplant lists).[2] So for every one transplant that went ahead in the 2006-07 period a little over three more were demanded.

So there is a serious shortage of organs. More organs are needed because demand has increased, with medical advances allowing new transplants and an ageing population needing more of them, while supply has fallen – transplantation is only possible from the recently deceased, in practice, people who die in hospital, and as medical practice and road safety improve, less people are able to donate.

As of the 11th February, 15,006,985 people or 24% of the population[3] had signed up to the NHS Organ Donor Register. This will impress some (that over 15 million people have made the effort to sign up) and depress others (only one in four people are willing to help others live after they have died?) depending on individual points of view. But what is clear is that the number of organ donors is not sufficient. In the UK, the rate of 12.9 organ donors for every million people in the population is much lower than the rate of 35 donors per million in Spain[4], which has been held up as a model system by ‘opt-out’ supporters.

[1] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2008/01/13/norgans213.xml
[2] All figures in this paragraph: http://www.uktransplant.org.uk/ukt/statistics/transplant_activity_report/current_activity_reports/ukt/transplant_activity_uk_2006-2007.pdf
[3] http://www.uktransplant.org.uk/ukt/default.jsp
[4] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/7183798.stm

So, is it the case that the type of donation system in place in a country will affect the number of people signed up for organ donation? In neoclassical economic theory, it shouldn’t make a difference: individuals should weigh up the costs and benefits of a decision and always come to the same outcome regardless of whether it’s an opt-in or opt-out system.

But, during the Lionel Robbins Memorial lecture series in the Old Theatre last term, David Laibson of Harvard University showed why this isn’t the case. Focussing upon employee decisions over how to save their pension contributions, Laibson showed that when an employer sets an automatic proportion of income to be saved and a default type of pension fund for it to be invested in, a huge proportion of employees stuck with these defaults even when the proportion of income saved was low (there is normally an incentive to save more, as often the employer will match the amount contributed) and the type of stock invested in was very conservative. Sure enough, when the same company removed these defaults and instead obligated employees to choose both a savings rate and where the money was being invested, the savings rate increased and there was a change in the type of funds receiving the investment.

So, how does this cross over to organ donation? Laibson identified four psychological factors to explain this behaviour: financial illiteracy, endorsement effects from an institution that people trust, complexity or the cost of decision making, and present biased preferences. The first three factors do not really apply to UK organ donation although the endorsement effects of the government would make an interesting tangent – do the British population trust/support the government on this or not?

But by far the biggest effects on organ donation will come from the last factor, present biased preferences. In laymen’s terms this is procrastination. Dr Laibson presented a simple model for procrastination in his lecture. For an employee about to enrol into a pension plan the benefits of doing so are huge. Suppose the costs of making the decision are £50 and every day that passes she loses £10 of the overall benefit (counted as a cost in the workings below). Finally there is a discount factor for costs and benefits in the future. So the cost of doing something is the cost today plus the future cost reduced by the discount factor. Supposing that the employee’s discount factor is a half:

Cost of making the decision today = £50
Cost of making the decision tomorrow = 0 + (50+10)/2 = £30
Cost of making the decision in two days time = 0 + (50+20)/2 = £35As the minimum cost occurs tomorrow that is when a rational individual should join the pension plan. But of course ‘tomorrow never comes’, and so this logic will continue on into the future (only stopping when the cost of making the decision or the discount factor decreases – possibly because the individual has more free time).

So if defaults in organ donation affect the number of people who are on the organ donor register, it will largely be down to procrastination. By the logic above, with the present opt-in system, there is a group within the population who haven’t got around to signing up. If the default changes as the PM has proposed, then the number on the register should increase and then there will be a group of people registered who haven’t got around to opting-out.
How much will it increase? Well, in a survey carried out in October, two thirds of people said that they would be “willing to donate their organs for transplantation after their death.”[1] But how far do we trust a survey when in reality only one in four people have signed up to the donors register?

While the opt-in or out register has made the headlines and will increase the ranks of potential organ donors, a more important aspect of our Spanish model may be the dialogue between specialised ‘transplant co-ordinators’ and families of potential donors after their death. The wishes of families still affect whether organs can be donated or not; in the UK there is a 40% family refusal rate compared to 15% in Spain (it was 30% in the 1990s)[2]. This has been attributed to the specially trained transplant co-ordinators in Spanish hospitals who attempt to persuade families to consider donation amidst their grief.

So perhaps the shortage of organs for transplantation will be more significantly addressed through specialised workers addressing the attitudes of families to donation instead of just attempting to increase the supply of people willing to donate (when their families in practice can make the final decision). But in practice we may have to accept that organ donations will never fully match the demand for transplants and so artificially created organs will probably provide the key to resolving this organ shortage.

[1] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/7051235.stm
[2] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/7183798.stm

news & analysis: the Webster ruling or how C.Ronaldo could go for just £12 million.

By Pierre Bachas (edited by Serena)

Andy Webster, doesn’t have Drogba’s strength nor C.Ronaldo’s skills. Neither is he one of the wonder kids in Arsenal’s youth team. However his name could well be remembered as marking football history. Going back to the summer transfer window of 2006, Webster signed a contract with Wigan Athletic, while still on the third year of his four year contract with Heart of Midlothian. While the world of football was expecting Wigan to have to pay a major fine to Heart, this January the Court of Arbitration for Sport ruled in favour of Webster, the only compensation for his former employer being the remaining value of the contract, £150 000.

The ruling will most certainly have a vast impact for the football economy.
First, transfer fees, such as the £19 m recently paid by Chelsea for Nicolas Anelka, could soon be a thing of the past. Indeed why pay exorbitant fees when one can sign a player for a negligible amount, after the two years of the "protected period" included in the contract. To give you an idea, Tottenham asks for £30 m for Berbatov, its star striker, whereas he could leave for as little as £1.3 m in the summer of 2009.
Secondly, this would be extremely beneficial to the labour force – the football players. Shame for those who thought players were already getting enough money, wages could now rise to unprecedented heights, since it will become the only way for teams to keep a hold on their players.
Furthermore the duration of contracts could decrease and as a consequence, player mobility would increase.

However FIFA, the governing football body, does not look favourably upon this major shift in revenue allocation from the team to the players. A further increase in player’s mobility would mean the potential downfall of team values and identity and the fall in transfer revenues would be a huge loss for less wealthy clubs, who rely on training young talents. FIFA stated that: "Should the protection of contractual stability finally indeed be subverted, FIFA will consider appropriate measures to safeguard the special nature of sport with regard to employment contracts."
This is one more episode in the long lasting opposition between EU law and FIFA, and raises the question of whether the employment of players should abide the same laws as other labour markets. FIFA is on the counter.

C (consumption?) A (technology?) W (wages?) : A Rant in Progress

(Not to be published!)

To cheer me up, a friend recently made me read about John Maynard Keynes on the blog ‘More Intelligent Life’. And when I say read about Kenyes, I mean read about the man’s sex diaries. The article explores how the famous economist kept immaculate records of his adventures, one of which is a coded diary kept year-by-year, in quarterly increments. The activities Keynes performed are categorised as “C”, “A” or “W”, and the writer goes on rather a bit too gleefully to speculate what those letter may mean, and the implications of Keynes’ tally. (An example: “Surprisingly, for several quarters, W happened zero times. So either Keynes didn't bother to masturbate, or he didn't need to because his other numbers are so high.”)

What bugged me about the piece is not so much the crude language. I don’t mind “cock-sucking”, “copulation”, “masturbating” or comparing seeking anonymous sex with investing in the stock market. With a title like “The Sex Diaries of John Maynard Keynes”, I wasn’t expecting something clean. But I was expecting… something novel. Why should I care whether Keynes “C”-ed 28 times between August and November 1908? Why should I care whether he chose to Wank, sleep with a Woman, sleep with his Wife, have sex at Work? What can any of these inform us about Bretton Woods? What do any of these add to our macroeconomic knowledge?

Nothing much really.

(To be continued...)

economic impact of hiv/aids in sub-saharan africa

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF HIV/AIDS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Summary

1. There are roughly 40 million people world-wide infected with HIV; sub-Saharan Africa accounts for around 25 million of these. A disproportionately high three-quarters of global deaths from AIDS in 2006 were in Sub-Saharan Africa.

2. The HIV/AIDS epidemic is a major threat to Africa’s economic development. The impact is widespread, affecting individuals, households, firms and governments. The epidemic will harm prospects for African economic growth in both the near and long term. Most importantly, the impact on growth and the economy in turn “feed back” and foster the spread of HIV infection.

3. It is estimated that HIV/AIDS is already reducing sub-Saharan annual GDP growth by between 0.8 and 1.4 percentage points. Countries with prevalence of over 20 per cent may suffer a reduction of up to 2.6 points annually. For a typical sub-Saharan economy this means that after two decades GDP could be less than two-thirds of what it would have been without HIV/AIDS. It has been argued that, without mitigation, this will make it impossible for Africa to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.

Background

4. Sub-Saharan Africa is home to around 26 million people living with HIV. In 2005 it is estimated that 3.2m became newly infected with HIV, while 2.4m died of AIDS.

5. There are large variations in HIV/AIDS prevalence across the region. Southern Africa remains the epicentre of the epidemic; over 30 per cent of people infected with HIV world-wide are here. Prevalence has stabilised in a number of Southern and Sub-Saharan African countries, although it remains at very high levels and only in Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe does the epidemic appear to be declining.

6. The rate of HIV infection over the past two decades has been described as the first wave of the epidemic. The extent of this wave determines the size of the next one: deaths from AIDS. These combine to bring about a third wave: the widespread social, economic and political impact of HIV/AIDS, felt by infected and non- infected alike.

Current growth

7. HIV/AIDS has the potential for a devastating impact on economic growth because of its impact on the labour market. Illness and mortality from HIV/AIDS reduce the overall supply of effective labour. The composition of the labour force also changes, as young people, especially young women, who should be in their most productive years are more at risk of HIV infection than other demographic groups.

8. HIV/AIDS reduces households’ income. Studies in Tanzania have shown that when a household contains an AIDS patient, the household labour supply falls by up to 43 per cent. A chronically ill member is estimated to reduce average household annual income across Southern Africa by up to 35 per cent; the figure resulting from an adult death is even higher. Declining income is, in addition, stretched by the cost of health care and funerals, expenditure on which have been found to take up almost half of household income in Zimbabwe.

9. Agriculture is the largest sector in most African economies, making up the majority of employment, but it is coming under increasing pressure from the HIV/AIDS epidemic. If just a few workers are lost at crucial times of the year then this can have a disproportionate effect on harvests and income. In Zimbabwe for instance it is estimated that an adult death from AIDS shrinks household production of maize, the local staple, by over 60 per cent.

10. Firms may also be significantly affected by HIV/AIDS. In South Africa, a third of companies told the South African Business Coalition that HIV/AIDS has had a negative impact on profits. In general, this is due to the effect HIV/AIDS has in both raising costs and reducing revenues. Production, and hence revenue, falls with a decline in workers’ productivity, due to illness and absenteeism. Studies have shown that firms’ costs also rise significantly; in Uganda and Botswana the annual cost of AIDS for each employee, in the form of health care, training and insurance, is as much as $300. Annual spending on all health care in Uganda averages around $20 per capita; in the UK it is about $1,600.

11. Governments’ budget balances are likely to deteriorate as health sector costs rise with the number of AIDS patients, who are more expensive to treat than those with other conditions, and the tax base shrinks. Health expenditure is projected to increase, although services are increasingly stretched; in many African hospitals AIDS patients occupy more than half of the beds. Indeed, there is limited evidence of the ability for increased expenditure to meet increased demand for health services. Governments therefore face a number of trade-offs in their allocation of spending: between AIDS treatment and HIV prevention measures, between AIDS and other illnesses and indeed between spending on health and other sectors.

12. Incorporating the effects of HIV/AIDS on households, firms and governments into estimates of the immediate macroeconomic impact is a difficult task. Over time, economists have been able to expand their models to include a greater range of costs from HIV/AIDS and predictions for short-term growth have, as a result, become increasingly gloomy. The World Bank in 1992 estimated that across 30 sub-Saharan economies AIDS reduces GDP growth by between 0.8 and 1.4 percentage points a year. Studies in 2000 found that South Africa is expected to lose 1.6 percentage points of GDP growth a year, while Botswana may lose up to 4.4 percentage points annually.

Long run growth potential

13. HIV/AIDS also hampers long-term growth prospects. The level of savings is an important determinant of the potential for an economy to expand over time, as households’ savings finance business’ investment. Investment allows for the accumulation of capital, such as machines, or computers, which in turn allows firms to expand production and raise national income. However, HIV/AIDS leads savings to fall dramatically, through both a reduction of households’ income and the additional strains placed on expenditure by rising health costs. A study in Cote d’Ivoire showed that amongst urban households with an AIDS patient, expenditure was a third higher than income, meaning savings were negative. This is typical of many sub-Saharan economies. A savings deficiency therefore hampers the opportunity for investment, preventing the economy from expanding.

14. Another important determinant of long run growth in an economy is how well capital and other resources are used, i.e. the level of productivity in the economy. Productivity growth allows production of more output from a certain level of inputs, increasing the level of income that can be received from these inputs. This is influenced firstly by workers’ productivity, which is likely to decline sharply as a result of HIV/AIDS, as young workers, who should be in their most productive years, are most at risk from the epidemic. As life expectancy for young workers falls, so too does the incentive to undertake education and training, further reducing labour productivity. This will contribute to a decline in economy-wide productivity, which is likely to be exacerbated by the fall in investment outlined above.

15. Due to the impact of HIV/AIDS on the determinants of long run growth, the effects of HIV/AIDS on the macro-economy are expected to increase significantly over time. Consequently, economists’ predictions of the loss to GDP have been increasingly bleak. A 2001 IMF report in Botswana concluded that in the decade to 2010, almost a third of GDP would be lost as a result of AIDS. Previous studies in Malawi and Tanzania have shown that over two decades a quarter of GDP would be lost to AIDS. Furthermore, a recent World Bank analysis of the long-term impact in South Africa argued that, due to the damage to human capital as knowledge and skills decline, the key impact of HIV/AIDS would not be seen even in the next 10 to 15 years.

16. Perhaps the most important point to note is that the causality between HIV/AIDS prevalence and macroeconomic devastation works both ways. Just as HIV/AIDS places severe strain on the functioning of the economy, the economic impact fosters an environment in which the epidemic proliferates. The loss of households’ production and income as a result of AIDS morbidity and mortality, especially amongst young people, in turn means that surviving children and young adults are less likely to be educated or well-nourished. This makes them more susceptible to the risk behaviours that spread HIV. Sub-Saharan Africa potentially faces a vicious cycle of economic slowdown, poverty and the spread of HIV/AIDS.

Conclusions

17. The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the Millennium Development Goals set out clear targets for Africa’s development. NEPAD aims for 7 per cent average annual growth across the continent, while the MDGs hope to reduce poverty by half and eliminate hunger by 2015. Both are unlikely given the potentially destructive consequences of HIV/AIDS for Africa’s economy.

18. Urgent action is therefore needed to prevent Africa’s descent into the vicious cycle of HIV/AIDS. As political will and funding increase, it is especially important that the FCO is aware of the economic impact of HIV/AIDS and that we provide greater support for DFID and HMG in tackling the epidemic, efforts which will help to raise the life expectancy and living standards of millions across the African continent.

Appendix 1: Selected growth predictions for sub-Saharan economies affected by HIV/AIDS.

Date of study
Country
HIV prevalence %
Period of Projection
Overall loss to GDP (per cent)
Annual loss to GDP (percentage points)
1993
Tanzania
7
1985-2010
15-25
0.8-1.4
1993
Malawi
14.1
1995-2010
15-25
0.2-0.3
1996
Kenya
6.1
1996-2005
14
1.5
2000
South Africa
20
1998-2010
17
1.6
2001
Botswana
24.1
1999-2010
32
3.3-4.4

Appendix 2: Sub-Saharan Countries with more than 100,000 people living with HIV

Country
People living with HIV/AIDS
Adult (15-49) rate %
Women with HIV/AIDS
Children with HIV/AIDS
AIDS deaths
Angola
320,000
3.7
170,000
35,000
30,000
Botswana
270,000
24.1
140,000
14,000
120,000
Burkina Faso
150,000
2.0
80,000
17,000
12,000
Burundi
150,000
3.3
79,000
20,000
13,000
Cameroon
510,000
5.4
290,000
43,000
46,000
Central African Republic
250,000
10.7
130,000
24,000
24,000
Chad
180,000
3.5
90,000
16,000
11,000
Congo
120,000
5.3
61,000
15,000
11,000
Cote d’Ivoire
750,000
7.1
400,000
74,000
65,000
DR Congo
1,000,000
3.2
520,000
120,000
90,000
Ethiopia
420,000-1,300,000
0.9-3.5
190,000-733,000
30,000-200,000
38,000-130,000
Ghana
320,000
2.3
180,000
25,000
29,000
Kenya
1,300,000
6.1
740,000
150,000
140,000
Lesotho
270,000
23.2
150,000
18,000
23,000
Malawi
940,000
14.1
500,000
91,000
78,000
Mali
160,000
1.7
66,000
16,000
11,000
Mozambique
1,800,000
16.1
960,000
140,000
140,000
Namibia
230,000
19.6
130,000
17,000
17,000
Nigeria
2,900,000
3.9
1,600,000
240,000
220,000
Rwanda
190,000
3.1
91,000
27,000
21,000
South Africa
5,500,000
18.8
3,100,000
240,000
320,000
Swaziland
220,000
33.4
120,000
15,000
16,000
Uganda
1,000,000
6.7
520,000
110,000
91,000
Tanzania
1,400,000
6.5
710,000
110,000
140,000
Zambia
1,100,000
17.0
570,000
130,000
98,000
Zimbabwe
1,700,000
20.1
890,000
160,000
180,000

References

1. UNAIDS/World Health Organisation, 2006. AIDS Epidemic Update: December 2006. http://data.unaids.org/pub/EpiReport/2006/2006_EpiUpdate_en.pdf
2. Over, Mead, 1992. The Macroeconomic Impact of AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa. World Bank Technical Working Paper.
3. Bonnel, R 2000. HIV/AIDS and Economic Growth: A Global Perspective. South African Journal of Economics 68.5 pp820-50
4. Royal African Society and Africa All Parliamentary Group, 2004. Averting Catastrophe: AIDS in 21st Century Africa. http://www.royalafricansociety.org/documents/averting_catastrophe21.pdf
5. Stover, J and L. Bollinger, 1999. The Economic Impact of AIDS, Policy Project reports. http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/Pnacm899.pdf
6. Haacker, M, 2002. The Economic Consequences of HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa. IMF Working Papers. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp0238.pdf
7. Arndt, C. and J. Lewis, 2000. The Macro Implications of HIV/AIDS in South Africa, A Preliminary Assessment, World Bank Working Papers.
8. MacFarlan, M. and S. Sgherri, 2001. The Macroeconomic Impact of HIV/AIDS in Botswana, IMF Working Papers. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2001/wp0180.pdf
9. Bechu, N, 1998. The Impact of AIDS on the Economy of Families in Cote d’Ivoire.
10. Cuddington, J.T., 1993. Further Results on the Macroeconomic Effect of AIDS in Malawi, World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 7, pp403-17.
11. Cuddington, J.T., 1993. Modelling the Macroeconomic Effects of AIDS, with an Application to Tanzania, World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 7, pp172-89.
12. Bell et al, 2003. The Long Run Economic Costs of AIDS: Theory and an Application to South Africa. http://www1.worldbank.org/hiv_aids/docs/BeDeGe_BP_total2.pdf
13. AVERT HIV/AIDS Statistics, 2005.

errr sorry no idea why the table is coming on as single column :S

anticipated articles

two more article outlines/commitments recieved:
one on GP HOURS AND CASE AGAINST AND FOR THEM FROM ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
second on MICROSOFT's PROPOSED TAKEOVER OF YAHOO

by Sarah Martin
....she wrote saying goodbye to pnuemonia in first issue
sound promising:)!

Slo outline

The Dark Side of the Euro
Case of Slovenia

Developed country, high GDP etc. First one to join eurozone, sees 6%inflation in the year that it adopts the Euro --> coincidence?

• short history of developments in the past 1-2 year (inflation affects sensitive products like food and sensitive groups of the society such as the low-income). What causes it?
• was it the Euro? --> directly? --> thru high growth, which was coupled with the lack of monetary instruments?
• Was it increase in price of oil and lack of competition? (official gov't explanation) – political economy aspects!!
• Was it the increase in the factors of production? (explanation by the industry and food retailers)
• Aftermath and solutions (workers demand higher wages --> spiral?), how can it be stopped, what is the government doing?

Comments welcomed.

(outline submitted by Igor Cesarec)